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ARGUMENT
POINT I
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROSPECTIVE
PURCHASER IS NOT A NECESSARY ELEMENT
OF THE "NOTE OR MEMORANDUM" REQUIREMENT SET
FORTH IN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
In its brief, Machan identified the policy
underlying the Statute of Frauds as follows:
The Statute of Frauds is intended to
protect against fraud; it is not intended
as an escape route for persons seeking to
avoid obligations undertaken by or implied
upon them.
Kiersey v. Hirsch# 265 P.2d 346, 352 (N.M. 1953).

To

fulfill this policy, the statute requires the existence of some
"note or memorandum" of the agreement between the parties.
See, Utah Code Annotated, §25-5-4(5).

There is no specific

formula by which one can measure the sufficiency of a
particular "note or memorandum," and a memorandum which is
sufficient in one case may well be held insufficient in
another.

2 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, §498 at 683.

In applying the Statute of Frauds, courts are compelled to
examine the facts of each case to determine whether the "note
or memorandum" at issue is sufficient to remove any significant
fear that a fraud is being perpetrated.

In such analysis, the

court is free to consider more than one "note or memorandum"
and to consider the circumstances surrounding the transaction,
including parole evidence.

Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 P.2d

369 (Utah 1980).
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After citing numerous cases which identify the
various elements necessary to make a "note or memorandum"
sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, Western argues
that there is no written instrument, or combination of written
instruments, which contains an agreement by Western to pay
Machan a commission upon the sale of the Iomega Park to
Birtcher.

None of the authorities cited by Western, however,

require as an essential element of the "note or memorandum" the
specific identification of the purchaser of the property.

If

examined closely, Western's unsupported argument requires a
real estate broker to specifically identify a ready, willing,
and able buyer to the seller in the written agreement which
calls for the payment of a commission to the broker.

Under

such circumstances, no commission agreements would be executed
because the seller would simply refuse to sign the same and
contact the identified person directly.
The issue in this case can be simply stated: did
Western agree to pay a 4 percent commission to Machan if
Machan procured a buyer for the Iomega Park and, if so, is
there some "note or memorandum" which sufficiently identifies
such agreement so that the Court is reasonably certain a fraud
is not being perpetrated?

Western attempts to confuse the

Court by arguing that there is no written instrument agreeing
to pay Machan a commission upon the sale of the Iomega Park
to Birtcher, and that, in fact, Western expressly rejected
Machanfs attempt to register Birtcher as a prospective
client with Western.

The registration procedure utilized by
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the parties herein was designed, however, to avoid
embarrassment respecting the identification of the broker who
procured the buyer, not a limitation of the agreement to pay a
commission.

The use or non-use of such registration procedure

is irrelevant to the question of whether or not Western agreed
to pay a commission to Machan upon the sale of the Iomega
Park, and whether such agreement is satisfactorily identified
by one or more writings.
Based upon the facts and circumstances set forth in
Machanfs opening brief, there is no question that Western
agreed to pay Machan a commission of 4 percent if it procured
a buyer for the Iomega Park.

Arguments that Machan did not

procure Birtcher as the buyer or did not properly comply with
Western's registration procedure may constitute a defense to
Machan's claim for a commission, but such arguments are not
relevant to the Statute of Frauds issue presented by this
appeal.

POINT II
THE ISSUE AS TO WHETHER MACHAN
PROCURED BIRTCHER AS THE BUYER OF THE
IOMEGA PARK IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT
AND, ACCORDINGLY, CANNOT BE UTILIZED
TO AFFIRM THE RESULT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S
DECISION RESPECTING THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
In the second part of its brief, Western argues that
Machan was not the procuring cause of the sale of the
Iomega Park to Birtcher and, accordingly, this Court may
affirm the trial court's dismissal on such grounds.

In support

of its argument that this Court may affirm the judgment on any
-3-

proper ground even if the district court assigned an incorrect
reason for its ruling, Western cites two cases, the first of
which is Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P.2d 860 (Utah
1979).
In Allphin, the defendant seller was granted
summary judgment against plaintiff real estate agent on the
grounds that the writing in question did not satisfy the
Statute of Frauds.

On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the

dismissal on the grounds that the commission agreement in
question called for the payment of a commission if the property
was SQ

ld

to one

of the identified prospective buyers.

Since no sale whatsoever in Allphin took place, and since
the offer submitted by plaintiff to defendant was from someone
other than those identified in the commission agreement, the
Supreme Court was confident that plaintiff did not and could
not state a cause of action.

As a result, the Supreme Court

affirmed the district court's dismissal albeit on different
grounds.
The second case cited by Western is Berry v. Berry,
738 P.2d 246 (Utah App. 1987).

The Berry case is a divorce

case wherein one spouse attempted to relitigate issues
previously decided by the court.

Such subsequent attempt to

relitigate was dismissed by the trial court on the grounds
that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the lawsuit was
vested in a different court.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals

affirmed the dismissal on the principle of collateral
estoppel.

"Because this is a threshold issue, we do not reach
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the merits of appellant's other points on appeal."
250.

Id. at

Neither of these cases supports Western's position that,

under the facts of this case, this court should affirm the
district court's decision on the different grounds that
Machan was not the procuring cause of the sale to
Birtcher.
To view the inapplicability of the above-cited cases,
one need only examine the posture and the facts of the case at
bar.

In this case, both parties early in the litigation moved

for summary judgment.

At the conclusion of the arguments on

both the merits and the form of the order, the trial court
granted Western's motion to dismiss Machan's First Cause of
Action on the basis that the Statute of Frauds was not
satisfied.

The trial court specifically refused to grant

Western's motion on the alternative ground that, as a matter of
law, Machan had not procured Birtcher as the buyer of the
Iomega Park.

This refusal is inherently logical in light of

the fact that the issue of "procuring cause" is a fact intense
issue, very little discovery by the parties had been completed,
and both parties had submitted affidavits demonstrating the
presence of an issue of fact.

Even though it did not raise, by

way of cross appeal, the trial court's refusal to grant summary
judgment on the issue of "procuring cause," Western now invites
the court to affirm the trial court's decision on such
grounds.
Though Western recognizes that the issue of
"procuring cause" is one of fact, it cites Hiniger v.
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Judyf 194 Kan. 155, 398 P.2d 305 (1965), and argues that
where there is no competent evidence from which a jury could
reasonably grant the broker's claim, the court may resolve the
issue of procuring cause as a matter of law.

Not surprisingly,

Western fails to point out to this Court that the Hiniger
appeal was taken from an adverse jury verdict.

In other words,

both parties had already had the opportunity to fully present
their case to the jury.

With such record in hand, the court

was able to make a determination as to whether there was any
evidence to support the jury's verdict.
was granted in the case at bar.

No such opportunity

Furthermore, contrary to the

Hiniger case, there is testimony in the record herein,
which presents an issue of fact on procuring cause and which,
if believed, could result in a verdict for Machan.

Without

attempting to list all of the conflicting facts and testimony
herein, Machan points the Court to the following:
a. In January, 1985, Machan introduced
representatives of Birtcher to real
estate opportunities along the Wasatch
front area. (Polcha aff'd., para. 5.)
b. In late February or early January 1985,
Capitalcorp Financial, Inc. ("Capcorp")
presented an offer to purchase the Iomega
Park from Western* (Slavin depo.,
p. 11.) Upon inquiring about the property,
Machan was informed that its clients who
were interested in the property should
understand they were in a backup position.
(Goddard depo., p. 28, ex. 7.)
c. Polcha had several conversations with
Birtcher representatives regarding the
property, sent them information as
requested and corresponded with them on an
on-going basis regarding the property.
(Polcha aff'd., para. 9; Trachman
depo., pp. 9-19.)
-6-

d. In May and June 1985, Polcha had
telephone conversations with both
Birtcher and Western. Birtcher
expressed an interest in the property but
was waiting to see what happened with the
original offeror. (Polcha aff'd.,
para. 10.)
e. The Capcorp offer was scheduled to
close in April, 1985. Such closing,
however, was extended to July 15.
(Slavin depo., pp. 14-15.)
f. By July 15, 1985, the date the Capcorp
offer was
again scheduled to close,
Capcorpfs financing had fallen through.
(Slavin depo., p. 19.)
g. When Capcorp first tied up the
property, it mentioned the same to
Birtcher to see if there was any interest
by Birtcher on doing something with
Capcorp on the property. (Slavin
depo., p. 24.) At such time, Birtcher
responded that they were not interested.
(Slavin depo., p. 25.)
h. Capcorp renewed its efforts with
Birtcher when its financing fell through
on or about the latter part of May or first
part of June, 1985. (Slavin depo.,
p. 26.)
i. At some time in July, 1985, Western
telephoned
Machan and informed it that
Capcorp1s deal was foundering and asked
if Birtcher had an interest in the
property. Machan called Birtcher and
informed them that the property might be
available. A Birtcher representative
said that he would pull the file and get
back to Machan. Machan called Western
and reported the conversation with
Birtcher. (Polcha afffd.,
para. 11.)
j. In August, 1985, Machan made several
telephone calls to Birtcher which went
unreturned. (Polcha aff'd., para.
12.)
k. On September 3, 1985, a Birtcher
entity known as Birtcher Investments,
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signed a letter of intent to purchase the
property. (Goddard depo.# ex. 20.)
1. On September 6, 1985, Western wrote
Machan a letter purporting to terminate
or disavow any obligation to pay Machan a
commission for the sale of the property to
Birtcher. (Goddard depo., p. 78,
ex. 21.)
m. After inquiry from Machan on
September 12, 1985, Western claimed that
"Capcorp/Birtcher" had "presented their
offer on January 30, 1985, as you well
know." (Goddard depo., pp. 83-84,
ex. 23.)
The foregoing testimony in the record herein clearly
demonstrates the presence of an issue of fact respecting
whether Machan was a "procuring cause" of the sale to
Birtcher.

Since the issue of procuring cause has not been

fully and finally litigated, the principal of collateral
estoppel does not apply.

Since a sale of the property at issue

has taken place, and since there is testimony in the record
which, if believed, would support a favorable finding that
Machan was a "procuring cause" of such sale, Machan in
entitled to its day in court where it can present, to a jury,
its entire case.
CONCLUSION
The facts and circumstances of this case clearly
demonstrate the existence of an agreement whereby Western
agreed to pay a real estate commission to Machan if Machan
procured a buyer for the Iomega Park.

Correspondence by and

between the parties and the parole evidence respecting the
facts and circumstances of this case clearly demonstrate that
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